On 19 March last year, the ADU website carried the following NEWS ITEM. It was among the first to break the news of this ornithological disaster.

'SAFRING ringer, Claudia Holgate, is currently aboard the M/V Prince Albert II, a cruise ship to the Antarctic. She reports: "On Wednesday 16 March 04h30 the cargo ship Oliva ran aground on Nightingale Island close to Tristan da Cunha. Because our arrival in the area was within 24 hours, our ship was informed by local authorities and asked to assist. On Thursday afternoon we conducted a rescue operation with our zodiacs to get the 10 remaining crew off the vessel. At 02h30 on Friday morning (yesterday), the ship split in half."

'Currently there is an oil slick spreading, and there are reports from Nightingale Island of Northern Rockhopper Penguins coming out of the sea covered in oil. Claudia reports: "The spill could not have happened at a worse place."

'The Oliva was a 75 300 tonne cargo ship carrying soya beans from Brazil to Singapore, and was carrying about 1500 metric tons of heavy fuel oil. The ship ran aground at Spinners Point, the NW corner of the island. There are many species of birds that are only found in this area and a major oil leak may have catastrophic consequences to the bird life around these islands. Nightingale Island and the closeby Middle Island host breeding populations of seabirds numbered in millions. Another potential problem is rats finding their way from the sinking ship onto the island and this is a real threat to burrow nesting birds. A salvage tug, the Smit Amandla, was dispatched from Cape Town on 17 March, and is expected to arrive on 21 March. The distance from Cape Town is about 2000 km. On board the tug is Estelle van der Merwe, who was in charge of SANCCOB at the time of the Treasure oil spill, and she is working in close collaboration with SANCCOB.

'More news, especially as it relates to oiled birds, will follow here as it becomes available.'

Well, a news blackout was pretty rapidly imposed. And very little information emerged at the time. But now at last, the final report from the shipping investigation has been released. This maritime safety document deals with what can only be described as the head-on collision between the bulk carrier Oliva and Nightingale Island. The wreck produced a massive oil spill in the Tristan da Cunha group. The 51-page document can be downloaded here. Here are some of the summarizing points in the report.

• Oliva ran aground because the planned course the vessel was following on the plotting sheet was found to have taken the vessel directly over Nightingale Island.

• Although the bridge team was aware that the vessel would be passing close to some islands, it was not aware as to when that event would take place.

• Although the vessel did not have BA chart 1769, other appropriate available charts covering the area had not been used.

• Both the second mate and chief mate were not aware that the vessel was heading towards Nightingale Island. This was because there was no indication on the plotting chart to alert them of the dangers ahead.

• Both the second mate and chief mate saw some echoes on the radar screen, but did not investigate them and dismissed them as rain clouds.

• There was no suitable mark placed across the ship's track to indicate the need to change to a hydrographic chart.

• Neither officer had consulted BA chart 4022. Although this chart was of an unsatisfactory scale, it could have prompted them to adopt a precautionary approach when radar echoes were sighted on the radar.

• The combination of the cold, the medication, lack of sleep, the time of the day and reaction to the vessel's grounding suggests that the chief mate was probably not fit to stand a navigational watch.

• Although the company had provided comprehensive guidance and procedures in its SMS to prevent this accident, these were not followed on board.

• The passage plan did not comply with the company's instructions of clearing distances when a vessel was in open waters.

• The master made no reference to the passing of Islands in his night orders. Reference to the Islands, could have alerted the second mate and chief mate to the significance of radar echoes.

• The handing over checklist required the chief mate to establish the proximity of any hazards to the vessel. This appears not to have happened and he relied on the brief hand-over he received from the second mate.

• The chief officer did not check the position which the able-bodied seaman plotted on the chart.

Gosh, what a disgrace – this is a disaster which was ridiculously preventable.